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ABSTRACT
Through the examination of charitable contributions in the wake of the 2008
Wenchuan earthquake, this paper strives to comment on donation tendencies among
individuals in Mainland China. The data analysis portion of this paper employs the use of
both binary logistic and linear regression models to determine the effects of carefully
discerned influential variables on an individual’s donation decision and extent of
donation respectively. Said variables were chosen by a combination of their frequency in
preexisting research and speculative causal theory. In addition to the importance of
obvious demographic and economic indicators, findings suggest that political status has a
pronounced effect on the extent of an individual’s donation amount. Consequently, this
finding also readily supports prior literature detailing the role of government in the most
recent and rapid development of Chinese civil society.
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Introduction

On May 12th, 2008, China suffered one of its most severe natural disasters since
the infamous 1976 Tangshan Earthquake. A near 8.0 magnitude quake struck the
country’s Southwestern Sichuan Province, originating in the small county (by China
standards) of Wenchuan. The Great Wenchuan earthquake (wenchuan dadizhen), or
Sichuan earthquake, as it has come to be known, claimed the lives of tens of thousands of
people. Since the earthquake struck during the early afternoon hours, many of the
casualties were children in attendance at school. Within the months immediately
following the natural disaster, reports from investigative news outlets sought to explain
this monumental loss of life among young students. In particular, the Chinese magazine
Caijing uncovered evidence implicating local cadres for mismanagement of public funds
that led to the shoddy construction of schools in the 1990s.1 For a number of school
buildings, bamboo had been substituted in place of steel from the original designs – the
schools (and the children within them) never stood a chance.2 The Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) was unwilling to openly admit responsibility for the gross negligence
committed, and even took efforts to silence the discussion of it in the media. Famous yet
controversial artist Ai Weiwei was met with much resistance from the Ministry of Civil
Affairs when he launched a citizens’ investigation to discover and document the names of
all the children lost in the earthquake.3 Like much else in China, the CCP wanted to
control the narrative.

1

Evan Osnos, Age of Ambition: Chasing Fortune, Truth, and Faith in the New China (New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2014), 129-130.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid, 183-185.
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This outbreak of civil consciousness in response to the Wenchuan earthquake
went well beyond risky news stories and the actions of well-known figures. The national
tragedy spurred a charitable renaissance of sorts, where individual donation levels soared
for the first time in modern Chinese history. Supposedly having had its ‘heartstrings
tugged,’ the CCP was at the very front of this movement both accepting donations and
encouraging Party members to donate on their own. The result was staggering, so much
so that 2009 (the year directly following the quake) has since come to be known as the
country’s “year of philanthropy.”4 Because of this outpouring of philanthropic
contributions, the Sichuan earthquake is widely regarded as the single event that has
forever altered the landscape of charitable giving in contemporary China.5 The donation
behavior witnessed in the aftermath of the earthquake stands in stark contrast to trends
from the previous Maoist and post-Mao eras. In comparison, China then and now bears
almost no resemblance. When China reopened its doors to the world in 1978, the country
as a whole was extraordinarily poor. Only a select few could have possibly envisioned
the path their nation was about to embark upon, but even fewer would have willingly bet
on its degree of success. Impoverished, internally divided and still reeling from the deaths
of beloved revolutionary stalwarts Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai (1976), the average
Chinese person was in no position to worry about philanthropy and matters of civil
society.
Fast forward to present day, wealth in China is seemingly ubiquitous. Forbes
Magazine now annually publishes a “China Rich List” (Zhongguo fuhao bang), and the
4

Leslie Lenkowsky, “As Charities Grow in China, They Challenge Government’s Dominance,” Chronicle
of Philanthropy 22, no. 8 (2010): 24.
5
Yuan Zheng, “Charitable Contribution in China’s Single-Child Generation: How and Why Do They
Give” (master’s thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2011), 31. <http://dscholarship.pitt.edu.umiss.idm.oclc.org/8695/1/YuanZhengMasterThesis.pdf>
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latest one from 2016 identified an increase of 35 new billionaires (and or billionaire
families) in the previous year alone with an estimated 400 total.6 The country’s growing
number of billionaires coupled with its rising middle class means that the Chinese
population is more than capable of achieving global relevance in regard to charitable
behavior. The Wenchuan earthquake is direct proof of this possibility.
Though much has changed, one constant has been the Chinese Communist Party.
The CCP has been instrumental in the growth and development of civil society in Modern
China, often opting for a “hands-on” approach in the monitoring of it. However, China’s
version of civil society is distinctly complex in the sense that its actors don’t conform to
the traditional roles prescribed by European philosophers. There is no clear separation
between the ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ that is a hallmark of Hegelian thinkers, and civil
society most definitely is not a “source of political change” that supporters of Marx and
Engels allude to.7 Hegel’s idea that the state is simultaneously linked to different societal
groups and individual members in one shared “individual national community” cannot be
applied to China.8 In the Leninist tradition, the Party is the vanguard of the people, and
the people don’t have a say in determining a shared conception of the common good. To
a certain extent, Chinese people still define themselves individually in terms of the their
role in the greater group or collective. They generally avoid using the term citizen
(gongmin) and disregard the notion of inherent rights (renquan) that is often associated
with citizenship. Consequently, the individual’s influence on civil society is negligible,
which has allowed the CCP to fashion its role and purpose in society. Not unlike the
6

Russell Flannery, “Inside The 2016 Forbes List of China’s 400 Richest People: Wang Jianlin Repeats At
No. 1,” Forbes Asia, November 2016.
7
Z.A. Pelczynski, The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy (Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1-2.
8
Ibid, 265-267.
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country’s state-led market economy, China’s civil society must ultimately answer to the
government.
The background story of the Wenchuan earthquake grants unique insight into the
interplay of the state and civil actors in China. May 12th, 2008 irrevocably changed the
dynamic of Chinese philanthropy and civil society, which makes it an ideal jumping-off
point for research on individual donation behavior. A better understanding of said
donation behavior witnessed in the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake could help predict
future individual donation trends, as well as comment on the nature of civil society in
China. Thus, understanding characteristics of those who did (and did not) contribute, as
well as the extent to which those characteristics may have influenced contribution
amounts becomes necessary knowledge. Through the completion of this paper, it
becomes clear that the CCP’s control over Chinese civil society is quasi~ paternalistic in
the sense that the state is continuing its monopoly over charitable behavior, but doing so
in a way that seemingly grants autonomy to the actors involved.

Outline

Section one is composed of the introduction, as well as a review of pertinent
literature in chapter 1. Section two consists of chapters 2-5 and primarily focuses on
theories behind the four most intriguing causal mechanisms—political status/civil
society, economic status, age/healthcare spending, and gender respectively. Essentially,
each chapter in this section is a different factor that could significantly impact an
individual’s willingness to donate and/or extent of donation. The causal stories for the

4

remaining variables are explored in the literature review portion of this paper. A full list
of hypotheses is included at the end of this section. Section 3 examines the data model (in
its entirety) in chapter 6 and concludes with final remarks in chapter 7.

5

Chapter 1—Literature Review

The word “philanthropy” can assume any number of slightly different meanings.
In both of his influential works on the subject, Robert Payton prescribes to a simple yet
widely encompassing definition of ‘philanthropy’ as “voluntary action for the public
good.”9 Adapting Payton’s definition and contextualizing it in terms of charitable
contributions, Mike Martin defines ‘philanthropy’ more specifically as “voluntary private
giving for public purpose.”10 With regard to examining a predominantly non-religious
and morally ambiguous present-day Chinese society, I find Martin’s “value-neutral” yet
all-encompassing definition of philanthropy to be particularly fitting.11 However,
understanding philanthropy and its role in Chinese society goes well beyond a simple
definition. More specifically, many individuals speculate that China’s historical
development under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) post-1949
revolution has been one of the major obstacles to the nation’s attempts to cultivate a civil
society today. In the 2015 edition of Asian Studies Review 39 no. 4, Elaine Jeffreys’s
paper “Celebrity Philanthropy in Mainland China” briefly examines the significance of
philanthropy and charity in the Mao and post-Mao era. Jeffreys notes that “philanthropy”
and “charity” (as we understand them today) were nonexistent in China up until the

9

Robert L. Payton, Philanthropy: Voluntary Action for the Public Good (New York: American Council on
Education/Macmillan Pub. Co, 1988).
10
Mike W. Martin, Virtuous Giving: Philanthropy, Voluntary Service, and Caring (Bloomington, Ind:
Indiana University Press, 1994), IX.
11
Ibid.
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government began market reforms in the late 1970s.12 Although philanthropy didn’t exist
in terms of private donations, similar types of state-provided welfare existed “rather as
services (fuwu) relating to care (guanhuai zhaogu), welfare (fuli), relief (jiuji) and
allowances (buzhu).”13 Through the utilization of the “state enterprise” and labor
relations in particular, the Chinese government under Mao Zedong effectively made “the
shift from asceticism to paternalism.”14 Andrew G. Walder further explicates that a key
trope of this new “paternalistic approach to labor relations” was “the provision of
collective services and benefits.”15 These collective services and benefits ran the gamut
from health insurance/medical care to pensions and childcare to education; the state was
the largest provider of basic consumer goods.16 In other words, the government’s
paternalistic attitude hindered the natural need-based development of a charitable
consciousness, especially when considering the Marxist narrative that viewed organized
charity “as the means by which elite groups attempted to prevent class struggle by
placating the proletariat.”17 In an ironic yet most likely intentional twist of fate, the CCP
became an elite group that relied on this paternalistic behavior to maintain political
legitimacy of sorts.

12

Elaine Jeffreys, “Celebrity Philanthropy in Mainland China,” Asian Studies Review 39, no. 4 (2015): 573.
Ibid.
14
Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988), 227.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid, 16.
17
Elaine Jeffreys, “Celebrity Philanthropy in Mainland China,” 573.
13
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Political and Economic Status

After China adopted its “reform and open up” (gaige kaifang) policy in 1978, the
nation’s lack of a civil society started to become increasingly more obvious as market
conditions took hold. Even then, modern conceptions of philanthropy only really began to
set in from the mid-1990s onward.18 Coincidentally, for around the same period of time,
Dali Ma and William L. Parish discovered a unique linkage of private business and the
government in China necessitated by a desire from entrepreneurs to improve social status
that met with the government’s desperate need to adequately fund public works and
welfare projects.19 As a result, Ma and Parish argue that “Chinese private entrepreneurs
gave considerable charitable contributions because these contributions elicited social and
political benefits in return” (as measured by appointments to local political councils),
which resembles the previous private business and government linkages via ‘charity’ in
the late 18th century France as classified by Tocqueville.20
A few years later in 2001, CCP leader Jiang Zemin formally lifted the ban in
place since August 1989 that prevented these same private entrepreneurs from officially
entering the ranks of the party.21 In this expansion of party membership, Jiang Zemin
married the public societal elite (previous CCP members) with the private societal elite
(entrepreneurs). Consequently, he solidified the eventual base group of those most likely
to take an active role in the development of China’s civil society through philanthropic
18

Ibid, 574.
Dali Ma and William L. Parish. "Tocquevillian Moments: Charitable Contributions by Chinese Private
Entrepreneurs." Social Forces 85, no. 2 (2006): 948, accessed November 13, 2016,
<https://muse.jhu.edu/>.
20
Ibid, 944.
21
Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for
Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.
19
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tendencies. This later becomes increasingly more obvious, specifically with party and
local government support of quasi-NGO led charitable initiatives. For example, in their
book Paying for Progress in China: Public Finance, Human Welfare and Changing
Patterns of Inequality, Vivienne Shue and Christine Wong make reference to one of
China’s education focused quasi-NGO charities called “Project Hope” (Xiwang
Gongcheng).22 Shue and Wong found that it was not uncommon for localities to mandate
cadre donations to a Project Hope local branch, and even discovered that “finding
external benefactors became an important part of their officially assessed contribution to
local development.”23 Even dating back to as early as 2005, the central government
through its Ministry of Civil Affairs has annually been recognizing individuals for
exemplary philanthropic behavior (Zhonghua Cishan Jiang), “with private entrepreneurs
and leaders of state-owned enterprises receiving awards for the recorded extent of their
donations.”24
It then makes sense that party members and other elites should be among the most
willing to contribute and most generous in their contributions in the realm of Chinese
civil society today. Not only do they have legitimate motivations and benefits from their
own charitable contributions, but as Bruce J. Dickson puts it in his book Red Capitalists
in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change, “the
more you have, the more you can give.”25 Dickson’s regression model examined
“Determinants of Community Contributions by Entrepreneurs” and his multivariate
analysis unsurprisingly found a strong positive correlation between ‘years in business,
22

Vivienne Shue and Christine Wong, Paying for Progress in China: Public Finance, Human Welfare and
Changing Patterns of Inequality (London: Routledge, 2007), 87-88.
23
Ibid.
24
Elaine Jeffreys, “Celebrity Philanthropy in Mainland China,” 575.
25
Bruce J. Dickson, Red Capitalists in China, 119.
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family income, and enterprise revenue’ with ‘level of donations.’26 However, on a more
interesting note, Dickson’s model found that “level of development (of an area/place) is
negatively correlated with charitable giving.”26 In other words, affluent areas were
associated with less charitable giving from entrepreneurs. The wealthiest areas by far in
China are Tier 1 Cities.

Tier 1 Cities

In recent years, cities across China have been stratified into five different ‘tiers’
based on their level of development with ‘Tier 1’cities being the most developed. It goes
without saying, the wealthiest strata of Chinese society predominantly live in Tier 1
cities. Although one would expect higher levels of contributions from more developed
areas like Tier 1 cities, Dickson speculates that the explanation behind his opposite
finding may have something to do with local community need being higher in less
developed areas.27 To some extent, this may reflect an interesting attitude towards
donations where the motivation for Chinese to donate mostly stems from the belief that
there is a true need in a certain place. That being said, disaster relief donations are usually
made because the need of the disaster-stricken area is pretty apparent, but it would not be
wrong to assume level of donations may be higher to places closer to the impact zone
with greater need. Understanding the severity of the damage caused by the Wenchuan
earthquake in 2008, the Chinese central government implemented its “Post-Wenchuan
Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Counterpart Aid Program” (Wenchuandizhen

26
27

Ibid.
Ibid, 120.
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Zaihou Huifuchongjian Duikouzhiyuan Fang’an) with the slogan “one province helps one
severe disaster affected area, using the entire country’s strength, to accelerate recovery
and reconstruction” (yishengbangyixian, juquanguozhili, jiakuaihuifuchongjian).28 As its
name indicates, the program paired twenty or so different provinces (or Tier 1 cities) with
various disaster-stricken counties in Sichuan province to increase charitable relief
donations with the hopes of speeding up the recovery and reconstruction process.
Because of this government initiative, one would logically assume that donations would
be higher for individuals residing in Tier 1 cities.

Gender

With regard to gender and philanthropic behavior, the research is anything but
conclusive. In their paper “Gender Differences in Charitable Giving,” (Mesch, Brown,
Moore and Hayat) examined the universally accepted claim that “female-headed
households are more likely to give and give more to charity than male-headed households
across all charitable subsectors and income levels,” which was put forth in a recent study
done by Debra J. Mesch at Indiana University’s Women’s Philanthropy Institute.29
Through analyzing two national datasets and creating their own empathetic concern
index, (Mesch, Brown, Moore and Hayat) found that women quite significantly outscored
men in terms of ‘empathetic concern’ and ‘principle of care,’ and when controlling for
these two motives (as well as other additional influencing factors) their results confirmed
28

Miaofeng Xie and Yanyan Liu, “Yifangyounan Bafangzhiyuan,” Nanfang Ribao A16ban: “Wenchuan
Da Dizhen San Zhounian Chong Zheng Heshan,” last modified May 12, 2011,
<http://epaper.southcn.com/nfdaily/html/2011-05/12/content_6959134.html>.
29
Debra J. Mesch, Women Give 2010, Center on Philanthropy: Indianapolis, IN, 2010, accessed November
27, 2016. <http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/womengive/docs/womengive2010report.pdf>.
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that women “are more likely to give and give more” in comparison to men.30 Interesting
enough though, the November 2016 Charities Aid Foundation’s (CAF) report found
identical donation behavior for both men and women just a calendar year after men
surpassed women in terms of money donated globally.31 The CAF also found that women
only tended to donate more in advanced developed economies, while men usually
donated slightly more in transitioning economies (developing countries).31 This poses an
interesting quandary for China, which does not quite fit either description. Parts of China
are significantly more developed than others, and it would depend almost entirely upon
individuals surveyed in the data to make a somewhat accurate prediction. Women have
certainly experienced a general rise in their socioeconomic status, but they still have a
long way to ago. For more on gender, please refer to chapter 5.

Age

Another traditional determinant of philanthropic behavior is age, and the research
is rather straightforward. Since the inception of the CAF’s World Giving Index in 2010,
likelihood of donation has always increased in tandem with age, and that holds true in
their latest report released in 2016.31 Specifically, 30-49 year olds in the mid age group
have seen a constant increase in donation level while the age group of 15-29 year olds has
seen their level of donation drop after five previous years of gradual growth.31 However,
as Pamala Wiepking and Russell James III found in their 2012 research article Why Are
30

Debra J. Mesch, Melissa S. Brown, Zachary I. Moore, and Amir Daniel Hayat, “Gender Differences in
Charitable Giving,” International Journal of Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Marketing 16, no. 4 (2011):
351, accessed November 27, 2016. <Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost>.
31
Charities Aid Foundation. CAF World Giving Index 2016. Charities Aid Foundation (CAF): 20-21, 2016.
<http://admin.issuelab.org/permalink/resource/25787>.
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the Oldest Old Less Generous? Explanations for the Unexpected Age-Related Drop in
Charitable Giving, the oldest individuals in the elderly age group tend to donate less in
large part due to a simultaneous worsening in health conditions met with more expensive
and burdensome healthcare costs.32 Much of China’s newly minted wealth is in the hands
of what would be considered the younger and mid age groups, but ruling out accumulated
wealth among the elderly would be naïve. The nature of China’s social safety net and
health care system may have some influence over the relationship between age and
donation. For a more in-depth look at this relationship, please refer to chapter 4.

General Statement of Hypotheses

Political Status
All else being equal, CCP affiliation will have a positive relationship with both
willingness to donate and extent of donation.
All else being equal, a position in a government department will have a positive
relationship with both willingness to donate and extent of donation.
Economic Status
All else being equal, level of household income will have a positive relationship
with extent of donation, but not necessarily willingness to donate.
Age and Health Care Spending

32

P. (Pamala) Wiepking and R.N. (Russell) James III, “Why Are the Oldest Old Less Generous?
Explanations for the Unexpected Age-Related Drop in Charitable Giving,” Ageing and Society Vol. 2012:
503-504. 2012. <http://repub.eur.nl/pub/38236>
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All else being equal, age will have an initial positive relationship with both
willingness to donate and extent of donation, then eventually reverse.
All else being equal, amount of health care spending will have a positive
relationship with both willingness to donate and extent of donation.
Gender
All else being equal, being a female head of household will have a positive
relationship with both willingness to donate and extent of donation.
Gender Interaction
All else being equal, being a female head of household and living in a rural area
will have a negative relationship with both willingness to donate and extent of donation.
All else being equal, the interaction of being a female head of household and
affiliated with the CCP will have a positive relationship with both willingness to donate
and extent of donation.
All else being equal, the interaction of being a female head of household and
having a higher level of household income will have a positive relationship with both
willingness to donate and extent of donation.
All else being equal, the interaction of being a female head of household and
having a higher level of education will have a positive relationship with both willingness
to donate and extent of donation.
Education
All else being equal, level of education will have a positive relationship with both
willingness to donate and extent of donation.
Tier 1 City

14

All else being equal, living in a Tier 1 city will have a positive relationship with
both willingness to donate and extent of donation.
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Chapter 2—Civil Society and Political Status

Throughout much of the developed Western world, the autonomous function of
‘civil society’ from the state is not only to be expected, but also encouraged. However, a
deeper understanding of civil society beyond its typical separation from the state is
necessary to understand philanthropic behavior in China. In analyzing the current
Chinese civil society, B. Michael Frolic refers to four perspectives on civil society that
have emerged since the fall of communism in the early 1990s: “civil society as a parallel
polis,” “civil society as citizenship,” “civil society as political development,” and “civil
society as governance.”33 The concept of “civil society as a parallel polis” is associated
with the creation of opposition structures outside of the state by active dissidents and
intellectuals standing against weakened totalitarian regimes that have wronged the
people.34 “Civil society as citizenship” involves a virtuous and elitist community of
citizens that operates in conjunction with the state on behalf of the common good, while
“civil society as political development” is the Western-based model that provides
individuals the space to politically define themselves and the freedom to pursue private
interests.35 “Civil society as governance” operates on the assumption that civil society is
the principal “lubricator” that both facilitates and links all the different parts

33

B. Michael Frolic, “State-Led Civil Society,” in Civil Society in China, ed. Timothy Brook and B.
Michael Frolic (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 46-67.
34
Ibid, 49-50.
35
Ibid, 51-54.
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operating simultaneously yet independently in the political sphere.36 In other words, civil
society is much more complicated than the hackneyed oversimplified understanding of it
as simply “against the state.”
Although arguments can be made relating certain characteristics of China’s
emerging civil society to the four aforementioned models, none of them quite accurately
depict the interplay between the Chinese government and the groups operating within the
very narrow space afforded to them by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Similar in
function to the nation’s state-led market (or capitalist) economy, the China model is
better understood from the perspective of a “state-led civil society.” Essentially, China
has cultivated its civil society through the creation and development of numerous
organizations that “serve as the support mechanisms to the state.”37 Fearing the
democratizing forces that have traditionally accompanied the growth of civil societies in
former authoritarian and totalitarian states, the CCP adeptly chose to facilitate an
interdependent “marriage of convenience rather than a catalyst for citizens resistance.”38
This “marriage of convenience” that Frolic speaks of bears striking resemblance
to the “Tocquevillian moments” documented by both Ma and Parish where private
business and the government linked up in the 1990s.39 Later party membership expansion
to include capitalists (private entrepreneurs) in the early 2000s shows the CCP’s desire to
rein in and control potentially influential forces (i.e. the societal elite). A move that was
both politically convenient, and economically useful. This play to control influential
forces becomes even more apparent when examining the CCP’s post-1978 recruitment

36

Ibid.
Ibid, 56-58.
38
Ibid.
39
Dali Ma and William L. Parish. "Tocquevillian Moments,” 948.
37

17

strategies, which aimed to form a consolidated technocratic elite through the targeting of
highly educated urban professionals.40 The changing focus of the Communist Party was
by no means a coincidence, but rather Chinese officials recognized the role that
intellectuals (zhishifenzi) and the economic elite play in traditional Western civil society
and the development of democracy. As Randy Kluver argues, Chinese leaders have no
problem with elites acting on behalf of “the people’s interest” and claiming
representation, but only if it benefits the state.41 Consequently, Kluver asserts that the
difference between the nation’s emerging civil society and Western liberal tradition has
to do with China’s tendency towards “elite-based civic discourse” due to the association
of status and its ensuing responsibility of representation, as opposed to individuals simply
voicing out on their own behalf.42 Quite simply, the Chinese elite has relative discretion
in dictating the scope and direction of the country’s civil society. However, it is important
to note that the societal elite generally support the Party, or happen to be Party members
themselves.
The government undoubtedly has a vested interest in an effective civil society,
especially given China’s inadequate and seriously overburdened social safety net. A wellfunctioning civil society can decrease the government’s welfare burden. Providing for the
general welfare of the Chinese population (just below 1.4 billion people) presents the
Communist Party with a problem that has only been exacerbated by the onset of
capitalistic market conditions and the nation’s embrace of global markets. Although

40

Yanjie Bian, Xiaoling Shu, and John R. Logan, “Communist Party Membership and Regime Dynamics
in China,” Social Forces 79 (3) (2001): 805.
41
Randy Kluver, “Elite-Based Discourse in Chinese Civil Society,” in Civic Discourse, Civil Society, and
Chinese Communities, ed. Randy Kluver and John H. Powers (Stamford, Conn: Ablex Pub. Corp, 1999),
20.
42
Ibid.
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many Chinese have seen a noticeable rise in their standard of living since the country reopened its doors in 1978, globalization has produced a growing number of “losers” in
China as foreshadowed by former Chairman Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote, “let some
people get rich first” (rang yibufen ren xian fuqilai). For a CCP that has staked a large
portion of its legitimacy on the promise of continual economic growth, an inability to
perform basic social welfare duties is a potentially destabilizing force and a potent
rallying point of discontent. Amidst further concerns of inequality, the Party internally
finds itself in a rather precarious position. Understanding the risks associated with this
possibility, Chinese government officials have taken an active role in the cultivation of
the country’s civil society in the hopes of partially alleviating the ever-increasing social
welfare burden on the state. Ironically, the argument can be made that the Party is acting
on behalf of its concern for legitimacy while at the same time giving birth to a
conceivable mouthpiece for future criticism if left unchecked.
The CCP’s role in the support and development of Chinese civil society is
difficult to comprehend without a requisite knowledge and understanding of the Party’s
proclivity towards the use of its traditional weapon, the “model” (biaoshuai). The
practice of emulating models not only has an established philosophical Chinese
background, but also is inherent to the traditional Chinese understanding of Marxist
doctrine that prioritizes the teaching of material through the application or practice of it.43
Particularly revealing is the fact that the Chinese language has two famous idioms
(chengyu) often utilized to espouse this principle: “teaching by word of mouth is inferior
to teaching by example” (yanjiao buru shenjiao) and “teaching by example is better than
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teaching by word of mouth” (shenjiao shengyu yanjiao). As Donald J. Munro explicates,
“Chinese believe that people of all ages learn by imitation,” which elucidates the deeply
ingrained meaning and purpose of models in Chinese society.44 Furthermore,
Confucianism teaches that man should strive to attain model status since respect and
honor hails from being worthy of imitation.45 Functionally speaking, models are
propagandized for the purpose of inculcating virtues, values, and or attitudes deemed
desirable by leaders for the greater public to learn.46 The era of Chairman Mao saw the
ideal Communist Lei Feng worthy of emulation through his model of “serving the
people” (weirenminfuwu), while the reform era under Deng Xiaoping adopted Zhang
Haidi as the preferred societal model of choice due to her “pursuit of knowledge, help to
people, and unique individuality.”47
The Chinese Communist Party’s use of societal models is well documented, and
usually reflects the grander goals of the Party at a given period of time. Although the
CCP’s propagandizing of models is not nearly as overt as it was during the Maoist and
Deng’s reform eras, it would be naïve to overlook the connection between modern-day
CCP models and the policy goals they serve to support. For example, shortly after the
Wenchuan earthquake occurred, reports surfaced that the widow of former Chairman
Deng Xiaoping was so worried about the earthquake victims that she donated her entire
life savings, and encouraged family members to make contributions as well.48 A local
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newspaper from the city of Jiujiang in the Jiangxi Province even published the names of
local cadres and other Party officials who paid “special Party fees” (teshu dangfei) that
were used towards earthquake relief efforts at the disaster site in Wenchuan.49 On a more
general level, the Chinese central government has also been recognizing private
entrepreneurs and head officials of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for their on-record
charitable contributions since as early as 2005.50 The CCP’s message is crystal clear: the
‘model’ Party member helps “serve the people” by donating generously to charity. In
terms of national policy objectives, Elaine Jeffreys asserts that the Chinese government
views aiding in the maturation of “professionalized philanthropy” (a byproduct of a
strong civil society) as a legitimate solution to help augment the state’s provision of
social and welfare services.51 The government’s dedication to this national policy
objective is even evident in the PRC’s latest “Charity Law” (cishan fa) passed in 2016,
which now officially declared the 5th day of September every year as “China Charity
Day” (Zhonghua cishan ri).52
Despite all these moves to “bolster” Chinese civil society, the government has
also passed a new law that deliberately complicates operations for foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (feizhengfu zuzhi). Previously, foreign NGOs found
themselves forced to operate under the auspices of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but
China’s new foreign NGO law passed in 2016 now tasks the Ministry of Public Safety

49

“Quanshi Dangyuan He Lingdao Ganbu Xiang Wenchuan Dizhen Zaiqu Jiao Teshu Dangfei,” Jiujiang
Ribao in Huaxia Jingwei (Wangluo Xinxi Zhongxin), May 21, 2008,
<http://www.huaxia.com/qljj/2008/00810599.html>
50
Elaine Jeffreys, “Celebrity Philanthropy in Mainland China,” 571-588.
51
Ibid.
52
Charity Law of the People’s Republic of China, The National People’s Congress (12th), 2016, Chairman's
Order No. 43, Chapter 1, Article 7. <http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2016-03/19/content_5055467.htm>

21

with the registration and management of foreign NGOs.53 The requirement for foreign
NGOs to be sponsored by existing government organizations referred to (in the script of
the law itself) as “professional supervisory units” (yewu zhuguan danwei) still remains
intact.54 These “professional supervisory units” have come to be known as “mothers-inlaw,” which grants insight into their “popularity” among those in the foreign NGO
community.55 Ideally, China’s government should want its own burgeoning number of
domestic-born NGOs to learn from their efficient and well-established foreign
counterparts, but that is hardly the case. The CCP continues its record of rejecting
Western influence in the country’s social and civil sphere by intentionally making it
difficult to abide by China’s latest foreign NGO law. This is yet another example of the
Party’s desire to foster Chinese civil society into a subservient state support apparatus as
opposed to an independent and potentially rebellious force.
As a result, an individual’s political status should be a key component in
analyzing charitable behavior like donation tendencies in Mainland China. More
specifically, political affiliation with the Chinese Communist Party should reflect both an
increased willingness to donate and a larger extent of donation relative to other
characteristics. Given the CCP’s use of model Party members and its desire to
supplement the state’s social welfare provision in the name of safeguarding political
legitimacy, it is logical to assume that CCP members and individuals working for the
government would act in the best interest of the Party when it comes to their donation
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tendencies. The hands-on role of government officials in China’s state-led civil society
should be apparent in the results of this study. If political status is as important as recent
history indicates, then one would logically expect Party membership (and/or government
job status) to be an accurate predictor for both donation decision and amount.
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Chapter 3—Economic Status

Generally speaking, political and economic status are often intimately related in
China. As of late, there has been a pervasive belief that admission to the ranks of the
Party will open doors previously considered to be locked for those without the proper
political connections. Despite ramped up college recruitment efforts by the CCP in the
last forty years, surveys indicate that college students generally prioritize their individual
career aspirations over commitment to the Party’s orthodox ideology.56 Low salaries of
civil servants (Party affiliated more often than not) have traditionally been boosted by
lavish meals, fancy gifts, and various other benefits that are now viewed (and punished)
by the current administration as graft and corruption.57 Regardless, an individual’s
political status (CCP affiliation and/or government job) in the past has more often than
not resulted in tangible economic benefits, which means that it is safe to conclude that a
significant portion of the economic societal elite have strong political connections. In that
case, donation tendencies of the wealthy should be very similar to those with political
status.
Wealthier individuals obviously tend to donate more all throughout the world
because they have the means to do so. As Bruce J. Dickson writes, “the more you
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have, the more you can give.”58 This insight has not always applied to China though.
While traveling throughout Southwest China interviewing wealthy entrepreneurs, John
Osburg frequently heard the phrase “Chinese people have no beliefs” (Zhongguoren
meiyou xinyang) offered up as an explanation behind China’s previous dearth of
philanthropy.59 Osburg also discovered that many affluent Chengdu entrepreneurs in
particular were cautious when it came to “publicly visible forms of expenditure:”
Organized forms of charity and philanthropy were viewed as particularly
problematic because they not only attracted the attention of various state agencies
but were also believed to attract even more seekers of handouts and favors.60
To a certain extent, this concern reveals a fatal flaw in the CCP’s “plan” to encourage the
development of professionalized philanthropy. Party leaders in the Chinese government
want to unleash the philanthropic capabilities of their country’s wealthy elite, but the fact
that the government holds a near monopoly on charity creates what seems to be a lack of
trust in the government by those societal elites.
Eight full years after the Wenchuan earthquake, this trust issue has only worsened
as estimates reveal that “80% of earthquake donations probably transferred through
government financial accounts.”61 Some individuals chose to donate directly to the
Chinese central government or the Sichuan provincial government, while others chose to
donate to foundations like the Red Cross Society of China (Zhongguo hongshizi hui),
which is in fact not independent of the Chinese government. Despite firm promises from
officials at the Ministry of Civil Affairs to release donation information on a public
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platform, they have yet to follow through.62 Across totaled estimates from all donation
platforms (government – central and provincial, Red Cross, Taobao/Tencent, the One
Foundation, China Charity, etc…), only “15.1 billion (~23%) RMB (renminbi) of the
known 65.2 billion RMB donations have been publically disclosed”, while the other 77%
has still yet to be indentified.63 Clearly, and as always, transparency and corruption are
legitimate obstacles that stand in the way of wealthy Chinese donors.
In addition to transparency and corruption concerns, the nature of China’s tax
system only serves to complicate matters for those wishing to make charitable
contributions. Donor incentives like tax deductibles usually play a decisive role in the
growth and development of civil society’s key players, namely charitable foundations and
other non-profit organizations (NPOs). In China though, the lack of “a comprehensive
and integrated tax law specific to NPOs or foundations with clearly defined terms and
implementation procedures” results in widespread ignorance and confusion with regard to
potential tax benefits.64 For instance, as part of his master’s degree thesis at the
University of Pittsburgh, Yuan Zheng conducted interviews in the Southwestern Chinese
city of Chongqing to gain a greater understanding behind the motivation to donate for
many individuals and discovered that:
Of the 20 people interviewed, only 3 (15%) know about there was a tax deduction
policy for charitable donations. However, none of them have ever tried to apply
for this preferential policy to reduce their individual income tax. When asked
about the reason, “no knowledge on the deduction process”, “the deduction
procedures being too complicated and consuming” and “no desire to deal with
government agencies” are the major obstacles that have stopped donors to apply
for this policy.65
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China’s tax law may be comparable to other countries around the world, but in truth it
does not provide incentives facilitating philanthropic contributions. In terms of the
process for collecting a deduction, many of the reasons cited by respondents to avoid
applying are legitimate:
In China, there is no social security number that is tied to each individual, and the
tax is deducted automatically by his/her employer before paying one’s salary.
Individuals do not complete any form to report taxable income or deductible
income from donations. Therefore, when a person makes a donation, he has to get
through a very tedious procedure to claim the deduction. When one does apply, it
takes several months and a dozen administrative stamps to get the work done.66
There are certainly a number of key barriers that could potentially discourage donations
from those with the means to do so, but whether or not these barriers will influence
donations in the data portion of this paper is difficult to say. China’s set of relatively
immature tax deduction policies for individual donors provides a legitimate policy
explanation for those researching the disparity between donations from China’s economic
elite and the rest of the world’s.
Since this study focuses on donations in the wake of the Wenchuan earthquake,
where charitable contributions most likely occurred in China’s “year of philanthropy”
(2009), income levels should have a more pronounced effect on individual donation
amount.67 If the explosion of philanthropic behavior exhibited in 2009 holds true in the
sense that a large portion of the population chose to contribute, one would expect
individuals with higher income levels (or an individuals’ higher household income in this
case) to have contributed more. Through our knowledge of the political connections
among the Chinese economic elite in conjunction with the role the government played in
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the collection and dissemination of disaster relief funds/donations, it is logical to assume
that Party members and other economic elite may have borne a greater sense of social
responsibility in the aftermath of the Wenchuan earthquake. This sense of social
responsibility likely would have resulted in increased levels of donation.
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Chapter 4—Age and Health Care Spending

The ageing of China’s population is a serious concern for the Chinese government
that is literally becoming increasingly pronounced. Close to 15% of the current Chinese
population is 60 years of age or older, which equates to almost 200 million people.68 For
a point of reference, the entire U.S. population is north of 320 million. The nation’s
former “one-child policy” has incontrovertibly acted as an effective accelerant of this
societal phenomenon, as well as triggered a shift in the population’s gender
demographics as couples in large numbers chose to abort female babies in alignment with
their socio-cultural preference for male children. Speaking with any Chinese young adult
of single-child status about marriage will reveal the inevitable socioeconomic pressure
lingering over their heads when contemplating the prospects of solely caring for two sets
of parents into elderly age.
The effects of age and health care spending on philanthropic tendencies are to a
certain extent interrelated, and can be evaluated from an economic or financial
perspective. On one hand, as an individual grows older and accumulates wages from all
the years in the workforce, he/she should have more ability to donate compared to a
younger individual. This line of thinking concurs with findings referred to earlier from
the CAF World Giving Index 2016, where the odds of donation
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have increased almost in concert with an individual’s age over the past five years.69 On
the other hand, elderly age usually means the accumulation of more frequent and
expensive health care bills that decrease an individual’s means to donate. Prior research
on donation tendencies of the elderly confirms this, as donations decreased in the face of
rising healthcare costs due to a worsening in health conditions.70
In China, the interplay of these conflicting dynamics is interesting for two
reasons. Specifically, the historical memory of the country’s elder generation, and the
reality presented by inadequacies of its health care system and social safety net. In the
context of nation’s long history, China’s elderly have lived through an incredibly
tumultuous period of time. Individuals over the age of 60 have experienced first hand
both the horrors of widespread famine during the Great Leap Forward (dayuejin) (19581961) and violent infighting brought on by Chairman Mao’s Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution (wuchanjieji wenhua dageming) (1966-1976). From the Second SinoJapanese War (kang ri zhanzheng) (1937-1945) to China’s on-again off-again Civil War
(jiefang zhanzheng) (1927-1950) between the Nationalists (guomindang) and the
Communists (gongchandang), individuals age 70 and older can recall growing up in the
midst of a perpetual state of war. The legacy of violence, inflation, famine, and social
upheaval (land reform/redistribution) will forever be etched in their memories. The China
they know is radically different from the one younger generations have grown up in
where GDP growth is nonstop and the quality of life is consistently improving. There is
even a popular Chinese idiom used almost exclusively to refer to older people and it
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translates as “having experienced the ups and downs of life” (baojingcangsang).
Understandably so, there seems to be a greater cultural emphasis on social or societal
stability (shehui wending). This historical memory more or less influences the way
people regard political, economic and social developments. In addition to their detailed
analysis of various policy implications, Guonan Ma and Wang Yi briefly admit that part
of the reason why the Chinese savings rate is so high is because of “historical
experience.”71 Therefore, it is conceivable that historical experience could all together
discourage an older individual’s willingness to donate, or at the least decrease their
amount of donation.
For the longest time, development of China’s health care system seriously lagged
behind the nation’s economic growth. In 2004, The Economist estimated that 90% of
those living in the countryside and 60% of urban dwellers were without health insurance,
which only fueled out-of-pocket spending.72 With the exception of the extremely well off,
fears over the “collapse of affordable health care” contributed to higher rates of saving.73
In the past, it would not be out of the ordinary for individuals to save 40% or more of
their disposable income in case of needing emergency medical services, especially
migrant workers who are usually uninsured due to China’s household registration system
(hukou). On account of typically low salaries for doctors and abysmal wait times to
receive medical attention, it is common practice for patients to give doctor’s small bribes
in the form of “red packets” (hongbao). After public outcry for health care reform in
2009, the Chinese government implemented measures that have extended public health
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insurance to around 95% of the population.74 However, patients are still forced to pay a
significant portion of the costs of services out-of-pocket. Since comprehensive health
care reform has only taken place in recent years (after the Wenchuan earthquake), the
financial burden of healthcare costs is still relevant, especially for migrant workers and
the elderly.
Theoretically, only the very wealthy have the means to both spend lavishly on
health care and donate generously to philanthropic causes. As health care spending
increases, willingness to donate should increase along with extent of donation. At the
same time though, because health care costs rise with age, one would expect willingness
to donate and extent of donation to decrease. This would seemingly be exacerbated by the
fact that Chinese people often retire early (men at age 60 and women at age 55), which
means they are living off a fixed income via a personal pension plan or government
disbursed social security (old-age pension, yanglaojin). Either way, as cost of living
continually rises, it becomes more challenging to find the means to donate. It is entirely
plausible that age might initially increase both donation willingness and amount donated,
but I highly doubt that it will be a linear relationship. At a certain point, it most likely will
fall. Although it is difficult to definitively predict the effect of these different factors on
donation levels, this paper strives to clarify them.
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Chapter 5—Gender

As touched upon briefly in the literature review, there are competing claims
surrounding the donation tendencies of males and females. Research supports the fact
that women tend to be more charitable than men in the sense that they “are more likely to
give and give more” even when controlling for income.75 Mesch attributes this recent
growth in female philanthropy to both economic and social gains made in the past thirty
to forty years, specifically with regard to income and education.76 However, the datasets
that this claim is predicated upon are both national sets containing data from U.S. men
and women, making it difficult to directly apply their conclusions to gender-based
philanthropy in China.
As figure 1 indicates, global donation behavior for men and women has fluctuated
over the past five years with a higher percentage of the female population choosing to
donate from 2011-2013 and a higher percentage of the male population donating in 2014:
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Figure 1. Global participation in donating money, by gender
Source: Charities Aid Foundation, CAF World Giving Index 2016, Charities Aid
Foundation (CAF): 20, 2016. <http://admin.issuelab.org/permalink/resource/25787>.
Most recently though, men and women donated at comparable percentages for data
available in the calendar year of 2015 (see figure 1 above). As previously mentioned in
the literature review, an interesting divergence occurred between developed and
transitioning economies. The percentage of women donating in developed economies was
six percentage points higher than men, while the percentage of men donating in
transitioning economies was on average one percentage point higher than women.77
Therefore, the case becomes an interesting one for China. Although more aptly
considered a transitioning economy, countries like the United States have lobbied for
China to be considered a developed nation in the eyes of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) due to its economic might. One trip to Shanghai or Beijing might leave you in
77
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agreement, but seeing rural China in the undeveloped countryside will certainly make
you reconsider.
Although Chinese society is infamous for being historically patriarchal, China
today has made much progress. To a certain extent though, China still happens to “regard
men as superior to women” (zhongnan qingnü) in many facets of society, especially when
it comes to wealth. This reality has implications for an individual’s ability to donate.
Women have by and large been left out the country’s massive real estate boom, which
has generated an extraordinary amount of residential real estate wealth predominantly for
men as Chinese families choose to support men over women when it comes to assisting
with down payments on urban homes.78 Culturally speaking, the procurement of housing
is considered the responsibility of the man and his family. Consequently, owning a home
often becomes the most important requirement to satisfy if a man wishes to find a woman
to marry. No house often means that a man will remain a “bare stick” (guanggunr), or an
“unmarried bachelor.” Many women often contribute to paying for houses they share
with their spouse, but very rarely do they have their names on the property deeds
denoting ownership:
When so many women are raised to believe that it is only fair for their parents to
help their brother or male cousin buy a home because they are male, the same
women are likely to believe that it is only fair for the boyfriend or husband to
have sole ownership of a home, even though the women may have heavily
financed the home purchase.79
Citing a 2010 All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF) and National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS) survey of over 105,000 people, Fincher claims that “only one in every fifteen
single women owned their own home (6.9 percent), compared with one in five single men
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(21.8 percent).”80 This phenomenon may have greater implications for donation behavior
among women in this paper since the data is filtered through by each individual head of
household. Conceivably, the number of female heads of households may be so few that
gender (being female in this case) as a variable may be unable to cause significant
variation in individual donation behavior.
Regardless, gender dynamics in China makes predicting the effect of gender
(being female in this case) on donation behavior particularly difficult despite recent
progress women have made in education and the workplace. To get a true sense of the
significance of gender in determining charitable donations will necessitate controlling for
a host of other variables (income, education, etc…) and potentially the use of interaction
variables. Data concerns aside, I would expect female heads of households to be both
more willing to donate (in line with international trends), and to donate more than their
male counterparts.
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Chapter 6—Data and the Statistical Model

The dataset used for analysis comes from the China Household Finance Survey
(CHFS) conducted by the Southwestern University of Finance and Economics in
Chengdu, China. Released in 2012, the first wave of the survey had a sample size of
8,438 households, which consisted of approximately 29,463 individuals. The breadth of
the survey is extensive, covering nearly 29 provinces, 262 counties, and 1048
communities. Interviews were conducted over the telephone, face-to-face, and with the
assistance of a computer (computer assisted personal interview–CAPI). The reported
overall refusal rate hovers around 11.6%. The sampling design employed by the CHFS is
rather complicated, but it is comprised of two components: The first is an overall
sampling scheme made up of a “stratified three-stage probability proportion to size (PPS)
random sampling design.” The second is an onsite mapping scheme developed by the
CHFS that utilizes vector maps, GPS/GIS, and remote sensing technologies to aid in the
selection of households.81
Specifically, the analysis of this paper revolves around a variable for individual
contributions (converted to monetary value) in response to the Wenchuan earthquake. In
the interest of avoiding potentially skewed regression results, I decided to take the log of
this variable. Additionally, I made a separate dummy variable from the original measure
81
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of household contributions to exercise in a logistic regression. I separated the cases in this
dataset by head of household, which effectively conducts data at the individual level (by
head of household) so as to avoid distorting results through the overstatement of donation
amounts. Since the purpose of this paper is to determine the individual characteristic
trends of donators, two main questions need to be answered:
1. Who donated? Who didn’t donate at all? (i.e. characteristics of each)
2. Who donated more relative to others? (i.e. distinguishing
characteristics and the extent to which they influenced donation
amounts)
I’ve employed a two-step regression model to help yield the most comprehensive
explanation behind the levels of charitable giving witnessed during the immediate postWenchuan earthquake period. First, a binary logistic regression to predict donation
behavior itself; and second, a linear regression to predict the variation in donation
amount. Essentially, the logistic regression indicates the characteristics of who donated,
while the linear regression highlights the extent to which those characteristics influenced
donation amounts. I’ve also incorporated a slew of dummy variables to control for a
greater number of potentially influential independent variables (different characteristics).
Finally, I’ve chosen to compute a number of interaction variables to help test the
relationships between the different independent variables at particular values of each
other as well.
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Dependent Variables

As previously mentioned, the most important variable in this paper is the
Wenchuan earthquake donation variable. This hails from the CAPI portion of the CHFS,
question [A4009] that asks, “At the time of the Wenchuan earthquake how much money
did you donate? Please convert material donations to their monetary value (unit: RMB).”
Since the distribution of this variable was partially positively skewed, I took the log of it
(a common practice) to make the distribution more normal and better suited for
correlation purposes in a regression (see figure 2).

Figure 2. Histogram of the dependent variable, (log_donations)
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As figure 2 indicates, (log_donations) has a fairly uniform distribution, with a mean of
about 3.90. With this new variable (log_donations) perfectly suited for a linear regression
measuring extent of donation, I needed to prepare a form of the variable compatible for a
logistic regression measuring donation decision. A logistic regression requires the nature
of the dependent variable to binary, so I created a dummy variable (donated) from the
newly computed (log_donations) that takes on a value of 1 for any amount of money
donated, and a value of 0 for no donation amount.

Figure 3. Distribution of the dependent variable, (donated)
Even if an individual theoretically only donated 1 RMB (~0.14 U.S. cents), they would
still assume a value of 1 with this new dummy variable. Understanding the coding of this
40

dependent variable and its distribution shown above in figure 3, far more respondents
made the decision to donate at least some amount of money. The data from respondents
in the sample size confirms the general perception of donations after the Wenchuan
earthquake in China’s “year of philanthropy.”

Independent Variables

The independent variables (covariates) I chose to include range from a collection
of dummy variables (a variable that can only take the value of 1 or 0) to a number of
interaction variables. There are 17 of them total. 1-4) Tier 1 Cities: (province) is a
residency variable that the CHFS provides, but there are four Tier 1 cities that act as
“county-level administrative units” (shixiaqu) (run directly by the central government)
listed as responses in the variable’s frequency distribution. I made separate dummy
variables for each of the four cities (shanghai, beijing, tianjin, chongqing) that are coded
as 1 for residence in each respective Tier 1 city, and 0 for all other non-corresponding
answers. 5) Female: (female) is a dummy gender variable that is coded 1 for female and 0
for male. 6) Rural: (rural) is a dummy variable coded 1 for residence in the rural
countryside and 0 for residence in a non-rural area. 7) Age: (age_2012) is a variable I
computed by subtracting the CHFS variable [A2005] for “date of birth” in year from the
year the survey was conducted (2012). 8) Age Squared: (age_2012_squared) is the
computed (age_2012) variable squared for quadratic purposes in the two regression
equations. 9) Education: (educ_ordinal) is a recoded version of the CHFS variable for
education level [A2012], which ranges from a value of 1 “never attended school” to the
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value of 8 “masters degree” with various increasing sublevels in between for “primary
school,” “junior high,” “high school,” “secondary/vocational school,”
“college/vocational,” and “undergraduate degree.” 10) Health Care Spending:
(log_healthcare_spend) is a variable I computed by taking the log of the CHFS variable
[G1018] for money spent on health care the prior year in RMB. 11) Income:
(log_hh_income) is another variable I computed by taking the log of the CHFS variable
for household income. 12) Political Affiliation: (comm) is a dummy variable computed
for the response “Chinese Communist Party” to the CHFS question [A2015] that asks,
“You are of what political affiliation?” (comm) takes on the value of 1 for CCP affiliation
and 0 for non-CCP affiliations. 13) Government Job: (gov_dept) is a dummy variable
computed for the response “Government Department” to the CHFS question [A3014] that
asks, “What type of work unit is this?”
Covariates 14-17 are four separate gender interaction variables that were
computed by multiplying the (female) variable by various other independent variables to
see the effect of the two variables (at different values of each other) produced on
(log_donations) and (donated). For example, female heads of households with higher
household incomes, or female heads of households with higher degrees of education, and
so on. The complicated nature of gender and charitable donations necessitates examining
the possibilities of donation tendency variation at these different levels. 14-17) Gender
Interaction Variables: (rural_female) was obtained by multiplying (female) and (rural);
(comm_female) was obtained by multiplying (comm) and (female); (female_income) was
computed by multiplying (female) and (log_hh_income); and finally, (female_educ) was
computed by multiplying (female) and (educ_ordinal). Although the likelihood of these
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four interaction variables causing significant variation in either of the two charitable
donations variables is relatively low, they may divulge interesting instances of correlation
in the data.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
N

Min

Max

Median

Mean

log_donations

8135

.00

13.24

4.615

3.906

2.387

72.3

donated

8134

0

1

1

.798

.401

72.3

shanghai

29324

0

1

0

.05

.219

0

beijing

29324

0

1

0

.034

.181

0

tianjin

29324

0

1

0

.018

.135

0

chongqing

29324

0

1

0

.021

.146

0

female

29324

0

1

0

.492

.499

0

rural

8438

0

1

0

.38

.486

71.2

age_2012

29322

1

112

39

39.262

20.674

0

age_2012_squared

29322

1

12544

1521

1968.947

1747.69

0

educ_ordinal

24448

1

8

3

3.415

1.695

16.6

log_hh_income

8381

.00

14.91

10.24

9.767

2.267

71.4

log_healthcare_spend

3665

.60

5.26

3.259

3.135

.613

87.5

comm

15317

0

1

0

.13

.336

47.8

gov_dept

4404

0

1

0

.082

.275

85

rural_female

8438

0

1

0

.147

.355

71.2

comm_female

15317

0

1

0

.035

.185

47.8

female_income

8381

.00

14.91

0

4.499

5.101

71.4

female_educ

24448

0

8

1

1.617

2.025

16.6

43

Std.
%
Deviation Missing

According to Table 1 on the previous page, a few variables have rather high numbers
listed under the ‘percent missing’ column. Unfortunate as it is, the high percentages are
not necessarily unusual or unexpected, especially given the sensitive nature of some of
the questions respondents were asked.

Binary Logistic Regression

The logistic regression equation used to analyze willingness to donate (i.e. who
did/did not donate) and its regression results are provided on the next page:
Logged odds (donated) = β0 + β1 shanghai + β2 beijing + β3 tianjin + β4 chongqing + β5
female + β6 rural + β7 age_2012 +β8 age_2012_squared + β9 educ_ordinal + β10
log_hh_income + β11 log_healthcare_spend + β12 comm + β13 gov_dept + β14
rural_female + β15 comm_female + β16 female_income + β17 female_educ
N

-2 Log
likelihood

Cox & Snell R
Square

Nagelkerke R
Square

1132

423.873

.068

.189

*For the remaining portion of the regression table, please turn the page*
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Table 2 Binary Logistic Regression Results
Independent
Variables
Constant

Coefficient
Estimate
-4.203

Standard Error
(S.E.)
2.565

Exp(B)

shanghai

.172

.446

1.187

beijing

-.532

.471

.588

tianjin

17.463

7444.924

38362180.6

chongqing

18.816

13948.230

148498362

female

-.617

2.757

.540

rural

-.778*

.413

.459

age_2012

.233***

.072

1.263

age_2012_squared

-.003***

.001

.997

educ_ordinal

.376**

.157

1.457

log_hh_income

-.098

.200

.906

log_healthcare_spend

.665**

.260

1.944

comm

.848

.688

2.336

gov_dept

1.280

1.033

3.595

rural_female

.877

.720

2.403

comm_female

-.341

1.039

.711

female_income

.035

.268

1.036

female_educ

-.075

.196

.928

--

*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01
Inserting the coefficient estimates, the updated version of the logistic regression equation
is as follows:
Logged odds (donated) = (-4.203) + (.172) shanghai + (-.532) beijing + (17.463) tianjin
+ (18.816) chongqing + (-.617) female + (-.778) rural + (.233) age_2012 + (-.003)
age_2012_squared + (.376) educ_ordinal + (-.098) log_hh_income + (.665)
log_healthcare_spend + (.848) comm + (1.280) gov_dept + (.877) rural_female + (-.341)
comm_female + (.035) female_income + (-.075) female_educ
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Interpretation of Binary Logistic Regression Results
At first glance, the results of the logistic regression yield that only five variables
are statistically significant at any level: the two age variables at the 1 percent level,
education and health care at the 5 percent level, and rural at the 10 percent level. A oneunit increase in level of education increases the logged odds of donation by .376, or 45.7
percent using the “Exp(B)” value. Increasing the health care spending variable by oneunit ends up increasing the odds of donation by .665, almost 95 percent. On the other
hand though, living in a rural area results in a decrease in donation odds by about 54.1
percent.
The two age related variables are interesting. Since age_2012 has a positive
coefficient (.233) and age_2012_squared has a negative one (-.003), they form a
downward (concave down) facing quadratic curve indicating that the initial positive
effect of age on donation odds peaks at a certain point and then decreases. In the
traditional form of a quadratic equation (y = ax2+ bx +c), age_2012 can be thought of as
the ‘x-term’ and age_2012_squared as the ‘x2-term.’ The quadratic solution (–b/2a) will
grant the peak age, which in this case is 38.83 years old. So, until the age of about 39
years old, each additional year of age increases the logged odds of donation by 26.3
percent. After the age of 39, the strength of the relationship decreases. Overall, the
combination of all 17 of these covariates provides a relatively incomplete explanation of
willingness to donate as shown by the low Cox-Snell (.068) and Nagelkerke (.189) ‘R
Square’ values. However, given the rather inclusive nature of the dependent variable
donated where giving even 1 RMB is considered a charitable contribution, it is hard to
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narrow down specific characteristics as standing out in the decision to donate. So to a
certain extent, the logistic regression results are as expected.

Linear Regression

The linear regression equation developed to analyze variation in extent of
donation is included below:
(log_donations) = β0 + β1 shanghai + β2 beijing + β3 tianjin + β4 chongqing + β5 female +
β6 rural + β7 age_2012 +β8 age_2012_squared + β9 educ_ordinal + β10 log_hh_income +
β11 log_healthcare_spend + β12 comm + β13 gov_dept + β14 rural_female + β15
comm_female + β16 female_income + β17 female_educ
N

Ra

R Square

Adjusted R
Square

Std. Error of
the Estimate

1131

.610

.372

.363

1.54

*For the remaining portion of the regression table, please turn the page*
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Table 3 Linear Regression Results
Independent
Variables
Constant

Coefficient
Estimate
-4.316***

Standard Error
(S.E.)
.866

t-ratio

shanghai

.221

.153

1.440

beijing

-.518***

.159

-3.254

tianjin

-.063

.306

-.206

chongqing

.389

.559

.697

female

.146

.866

.168

rural

-.616***

.167

-3.691

age_2012

.170***

.033

5.193

age_2012_squared

-.002***

.000

-4.699

educ_ordinal

.323***

.044

7.361

log_hh_income

.181***

.058

3.123

log_healthcare_spend

.687***

.094

7.293

comm

.747***

.152

4.925

gov_dept

.479***

.155

3.079

rural_female

.720**

.288

2.503

comm_female

-.308

.236

-1.309

female_income

-.032

.081

-.396

female_educ

.042

.059

.707

-4.981

*: p<0.1; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01
With the coefficient estimates, the linear regression equation reads:
(log_donations) = (-4.316) + (.221) shanghai + (-.518) beijing + (-.063) tianjin + (.389)
chongqing + (.146) female + (-.616) rural + (.170) age_2012 + (-.002)
age_2012_squared + (.323) educ_ordinal + (.181) log_hh_income + (.687)
log_healthcare_spend + (.747) comm + (.479) gov_dept + (.720) rural_female + (-.308)
comm_female + (-.032) female_income + (.042) female_educ
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Interpretation of Linear Regression Results

The linear regression results are much improved in comparison to the results from
the logistic regression. Excluding the constant, ten covariates are statistically significant:
nine of them at the 1 percent level, and one at the 5 percent level. As in the logistic
regression, education and health care spending retain positive relationships, while rural
residency continues to have a negative relationship. So education and health care
spending increase donation amounts, but rural residency decreases an individual’s
donation amount. Increasing the head of household’s family income by one-unit results in
a .181-unit increase in their extent of donation. This time, both CCP affiliation and
having a government job are positively correlated with the amount of donation.
The age related variables exhibit the same behavior as in the logistic regression
results where the relationship peaks then decreases in strength. However, instead of
around the age of 39 like the previous time, the relationship between age and extent of
donation peaks at about 43 years old. Until the age of 43, an incremental one-year
increase in age will lead to a steady .170-unit increase in RMB donated (logged). The two
most interesting results by far are for the variables beijing and rural_female. Beijing
residents appear to be inherently less generous, since living in the Tier 1 city of Beijing
means an individual’s charitable donations suffer a .518-unit decrease. Interesting enough
though, being a female living in a rural area is associated with a .720-unit increase in
charitable donations. Although imperfect, this linear regression model is much stronger
than the logistic regression one. According to the ‘Adjusted R Square’ value, 36.3 percent
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of variation in donations made in response to the Wenchuan earthquake can be explained
by these 17 covariates.
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Chapter 7—Conclusion

Before revisiting causal claims made in the four main causal mechanism chapters,
it is important to note that correlation does not necessarily mean causation. The
regression results can suggest that there might be some truth to the causal mechanism
claims, but at the same time they must be viewed in the context of the model’s
limitations. Nevertheless, the two-part regression model yielded an array of interesting
coefficient estimates. Between both sets of regressions, only rural residency, age,
education level, and healthcare spending were statistically significant. As a result, only
these four influencing factors affected the variation in both willingness to donate and
extent of donation. Of the four, age is the most intriguing. With peak age for both
willingness to contribute and extent of contribution reached at about 39 and 43 years old
respectively, this suggests that older Chinese individuals are significantly less generous
than the elderly in other countries. As prior research (Wiepking and James III) found,
only the “oldest of old” saw this reversal in trend.82 Chinese individuals see it happen at a
much younger age according to the regression results in this paper. Although it is difficult
to speculate as to why, one legitimate possibility would be the onset of elder care
expenses for both the individual’s parents and their spouse’s parents. If the respondent is
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of age 40, it is more than likely that their parents are of the typical age of those needing
such support.
Next, for the two most fascinating regression result revelations: Beijing residency
and rural-female heads of households. Both variables were statistically insignificant as
covariates in the logistic regression equation, which means that neither could help explain
variation in donation decision (willingness). However, they help account for variation in
donation extent. Essentially, the Beijing residency coefficient estimate indicates that
residency in the specific Tier 1 city seriously decreased the amount an individual chose to
donate. As a key political center with a substantial number of wealthy elite, it is hard to
imagine a narrative to support this particular result. If anything though, it confirms Bruce
Dickson’s prior findings with donations from Chinese entrepreneurs. Specifically, the
fact that less charitable giving was associated with more affluent and well-developed
areas.83 It is also quite possible that the sheer diversity of respondents with residency in
Beijing can be blamed. In other words, it might just be that a coincidental
overrepresentation of respondents with non-controlled for characteristics caused the
variation in the dependent variable. It is impossible to say for sure. Similar to the Beijing
residency variable, it is difficult to come up with a legitimate explanation behind the fact
that being a female head of household living in the countryside actually increased one’s
extent of donation. Common sense would dictate otherwise, especially when considering
means or capability to donate. It may also just be a coincidence.
In my opinion, the most telling regression result of this paper is the effect of
political status (CCP affiliation and/or government job) on donation extent. Given the
Chinese government’s recent “hands-on” role in cultivating its preferred civil society, it
83
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is unsurprising that the findings from the data model suggest the relative importance of
political status in determining the amount an individual contributes. To a certain degree,
this grants credence to the effectiveness of the CCP’s propagandizing of models. Yes, it
is no exaggeration to say that the Party successfully mobilized its members (and spurred
donations) with a pervasive sense of social responsibility in the aftermath of the
Wenchuan earthquake. China’s model of “state-led civil society” will likely remain for
the long-term, and continue to serve the state in whatever social welfare capacity deemed
essential. More importantly though, the earthquake awakened a dormant sense of social
consciousness in China. Whether that social consciousness arose solely as part of a
growing wave of individualism or due to the efforts of the Communist Party, it’s hard to
definitively say. In all actuality, it’s probably a mixture of both. Regardless, the Great
Wenchuan Earthquake changed the dynamics of civil society and the individual in China.
The New Yorker’s own Evan Osnos put it best when he wrote:
For all of the devastation in 2008, the legacy of that earthquake was only partly
physical. It changed the way many Chinese people talked about government
accountability, charity, and citizenship.84
I would even add that it changed the way the CCP approached civil society. The
Communist Party benefited from the individual (and individual donations) in this case,
which only reinforced the idea that granting the illusion of autonomy for civil society
actors can be effective. In such a way, the Party was able to capitalize on the moment and
unify the country. During recovery and reconstruction efforts, Party media often made
use of the Chinese idiom, “much hardship/disaster regenerates a nation”
(duonanxingbang). Similarly, the nation’s civil society regenerated as well.
84
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